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CELESTE BOTT, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
. . 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
MARY TURNER BOTT, . . 
Case No. 11266 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This matter arises out of an order of the court 
appellant in contempt of court for failing to comply 
finding 
with 
an order in a decree of divorce requiring the appellant 
to pay a certain sum in lieu of alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, held appellant in contempt of 
court and sentenced him to 15 days in the Salt Lake County 
jail, for failing to obey the decree of divorce ordering 
appellant to pay respondent $2400.00 at the rate of $200.00 
P~t rnonth for one year. The court also enjoined appellant 
from continuing an independent action against respondent 
for personal property claims which had been adjudicated 
by the Honorable D. F. Wilkins in an earlier hearing. This 
case was previously before this Court in Bott v. Bott, 
20 Utah 2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 (1968). / 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the court should affirm the 
trial court's judgment finding appellant in contempt of 
' court and sentencing him to 15 days in the county jail. 
b 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from an order of the Third District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Joseph G. 
Jeppson, Judge, dated May 2, 1968 (R. 82, 83). The 
appellant seeks reversal of the court's order finding 
him in contempt of court, and sentencing him to 15 days 
in the county jail therefor. Appellant also seeks reversal 
of the court's order restraining him from continuing Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil 
No. 178623, Celeste Bott, plaintiff, vs. Mary Turner 
Bott, defendant. 
Appellant filed a complaint against respondent for 
a· ivorce on April 7, 1966 (R. 1, 2) The respondent answered 
anct counterclaimed against appellant for divorce on April 18, 
1'!66. (R. 6, 9) The court granted appellant a divorce 
on his complaint and also granted respondent a divorce on 
her counterclaim. 
A decree signed by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson 
was filed July 27, 1966 (R. 27, 28). The decree granted 
all of the real property of appellant to appellant free of 
all claims of respondent. Each party was awarded their 
own separate bank accounts. Respondent was awarded some 
1 specific items of personal property and all of her personal 
b 
belongings remaining in the appellant's home. Upon res-
pendent' s motion (R. 34), the court filed a further 
memorandum decision dated September 23, 1966 (R. 32, 33), 
granting respondent additional items of personal property. 
The decree also ordered appellant to pay respondent "in 
lieu of alimony" $2400.00 payable $200.00 per month for 
one year without interest. 
On June 7, 1967, respondent caused an order to show 
cause to be issued ordering appellant to appear and show 
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for 
Willfully failing to comply with the above decree and 
further memorandum decision. (R. 35) The court, Judge 
D. F. Wilkins presiding, filed its findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and order on the order to show cause 
' 
hea · ring July 6, 1967 (R. 37, 40). The court found as a 
ruattu of fact that appellant had $45.00 worth of res-
-3-
pondent's personal property and that respondent had $90.00 
worth of appellant's personal property. The court after 
adjusting accounts between the parties granted appellant's 
claim of setoff to the extent of $45.00. The court also 
found that the appellant had willfully refused to pay 
$2000.00 of the alimony settlement and sentenced him to 
five days in the county jail for contempt of court. The 
court granted a four month stay of execution in which 
appellant could purge himself of the contempt. 
Appellant appealed this decision to this court. 
Bott v. Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 (1968). This 
court held that the district court did not have juris-
diction to find appellant in contempt of court because a 
supporting affidavit had not been filed as required by 
78-32-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953). The court also held 
that the district court did have jurisdiction over the 
parties to settle the personai property dispute and affirmed 
the district court's decision in this regard. 
After rendition of the court's prior decision, res-
Pondent caused another order to show cause to be issued 
(R. 76) this time supported by a proper affidavit .. (R. 77) 
The · appellant was ordered to appear and show cause why he 
should not be held in contempt of court for willful failure 
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to pay respondent $2000.00 of her alimony settlement and 
why he should not be "enjoined from pursuing a suit filed 
against respondent in the district court for property claims 
adjusted herein on 7-6-68." The court filed it's finding 
of facts and order on May 2, 1968. (R. 82, 83) The district 
court found appellant in contempt of court for failure to 
obey the divorce decree, and sentenced him to 15 days in 
the county jail-. The court also found as a matter of fact 
that the property claims involved in the appellant's inde-
pendent suit against respondent were settled at the hearing 
held before Judge D. F. Wilkins on June 21, 1967, and 
restrained the appellant from continuing the suit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT TRYING TO COLLECT A 
DEBT BY CONTEMPT PROCEEDING BUT WAS ENFORCING 
THE COURT'S ORDER TO PAY A SUM IN LIEU OF 
ALIMONY. 
The appellant contends that the imposition of a jail 
sentence for contempt of court, because he refused to pay 
:he award of $2400.00 "in lieu of alimony," violated Utah 
~nstitution, Article I, Section 16, forbidding imprisonment 
:or debt. However, the appellant concedes that the court 
tay enforce the payment of alimony and support money by 
:oritPn1µt of court proceedings but contends that the $2400.00 
iward "in lieu of alimony" was a property settlement and 
_r:;_ 
therefore could not be enforced by contempt proceedings. 
The basis for a court's contempt power in alimony cases 
is explained in Browing, Enforcement of Divorce Decrees 
and Settlements by Contempt and Imprisonment in California, 
9 Hast. L.J. 57 (1957) at P.60 as follows: "it would seem 
that the distinction between a 'debt' as alluded to in the 
state constitutional provision, and 'alimony' in that the 
former relates ,to business transactions, whereas alimony 
arises from the marital obligations of the husband." 
· Respondent submits that the trial court in awarding 
appellant $2400.00 "in lieu of alimony" was not making a 
property settlement but was making a lump sum award in 
settlement of alimony. Judge Wilkins so recognized the 
award in his finding of fact dated July 6, 1967, on the 
first order to show cause hearing. Judge Wilkins there 
referred to the award as an "alimony settlement". A lump 
sum award in lieu of alimony has been recognized as proper 
in the following cases decided by this court: Pinion v. 
~nion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 (1937); Bader v. Bader, 
18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P.2d 150 (1967); Peters v. Peters, 
15 Utah 2d 71 394 P.2d 71 (1964). 
The court used the term "in lieu of alimony" in the 
Pet-ecs case and "in lieu of all claims for alimony" in the 
1 
i ' 1i,_,n '-rise to describe the lump sum alimony award. It is 
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apparent from those cases that the term "in lieu of alimony" 
is used to designate a lump sum.alimony settlement, not a 
property settlement. 
It should be pointed out that the authority cited by 
appellant in support of his position, Bradley v. Superior 
court, 310 P.2d 634 (Cal. 1957) and Stone v. Stidhum, 96 -
Ariz. 235, 393 P.2d 923 (1964), involved property settlements 
and so would not be controlling in the present case. 
In the divorce decree and the further memorandum 
decision, the court was specific in dividing the property 
between appellant and respondent. The appellant was 
awarded all of his real property free of all claims of 
respondent, each party was awarded th.~ir separate bank 
accounts, and respondent was awarded her personal belongings 
remaining in appellant's home. This was the property 
settlement not the award "in lieu of alimony". If the 
court would have meant the award of $2400.00 to be part 
of the property settlement, this item would have been 
included in the award relating to the division of property. 
The respondent also submits that the appellant was not 
being imprisoned for debt but was being imprisoned for 
failure to comply with a valid order of the court. In 
L~r~~Clift•s Estate, 108 Utah 336 159 P.2d 872 (Utah 1945) 
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this court upheld a contempt conviction against an adminis-
trator of an estate for failure to comply with a valid 
order of the court requiring him to pay over money to 
his successor. It seems that the necessity for the court 
to enforce it's order to maintain respect for court pro-
cesses, is present whether or not it is an order to pay 
money. The Supreme Courts of Washington and Colorado have 
both upheld contempt convictions for failure to comply 
with property settlements made in a divorce decree. Both 
decisions were based on the fact that the contempt was not 
for failure to pay a debt but was for failure to obey a 
valid order of the court. Harvey v. Harve~, 153 Colo. 15, 
354 P.2d 265 (1963), Deck~v. Deck~, 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326 
P.2d332 (1958). 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF SETOFF WAS NOT A SUFFICIENT 
JUSTIFICATION FOR FAILURE TO OBEY THE COURT'S ORDER. 
Appellant claLms that the court had insufficient 
evidence upon which to base a contempt of court finding, 
because appellant claimed a setoff. Respondent submits 
that there was sufficient evidence upon which the court 
could and did reject appellant's claim of a setoff. There 
',ias evidence that the appellant's claim of setoff had been 
cJ~:t"'n1inP<j l $ · · · n be 45.00 by Judge Wilkins in a previous 
h"'a.ring. 
-8-
"Q. Now when we left Court that day do you 
remember the judge said: 
•Mr. Bott, I find the value of the property 
she took from you was worth $90.00, but I 
find the value of the property you owe her 
is $45.00 so I give you a credit of $45.00.• 
Is that what the judge said? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You understood that at the time. 
A. Yes." 
In the court's findings of fact dated May 2, 1966, (R. 82, 83 
Judge Jeppson acknowledged and took account of the $45000 
setoff granted by Judge Wilkins. Judge Wilkins decision 
on the amount of the setoff is conclusive against Judge 
Jeppson in this case. Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 6 
Utah 2d 51, 305 P.2d 503, (1957), National Finance Co. 
of Provo v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 263, 382 P.2d 405 (1963). 
There was clearly evidence upon which the claim of setoff 
could be decided. 
Respondent further submits that a claim of setoff 
is not sufficient justification for refusal to obey a 
valid order of the court. It is said in 2 Nelson 
E!_vorce and Annulment, 2 ed. (1961) 447: 
"The husband cannot offset against his liability 
for alimony or support payments his wife's 
alleged indebtedness to him. In fact, it has 
been held that the husband cannot even setoff 
a judgment which he has obtained against his 
-9-
wife, as the alimony decree is to provide for 
her support and offsetting a judgment against 
her claim would be ~o aid in this connection." 
Keck v 0 Keck, 219 Cal. 316, 26 P.2d 300 (1933), and Wagner v. 
~gner, (La. App.) 134 So. 2d 670 (1961) are cited in support 
of the above statement. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the court 
·properly denied appellant's defense of setoff o 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE 
FROM DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS NOT VIOLATED BY THE 
SECOND CONTEMPT OF COURT FINDING. 
Appellant contends that due to the fact that this 
court reversed appellant's June 196 7 conviction for con-
tempt of court, Utah Constitution Article I Section 12 
prevents him from being tried again for the same contempt. 
Respondent submits that the appellant's rights under 
Article I Section 12 were not violated in this case. 
The contempt of court finding on May 2, 1968, was 
not based on the same contempt of which appellant was 
convicted in June of 1967. The contempt is for refusal 
to obey a valid order of the court. There is a continuing 
violation until appellant obeys the order. The respondent's 
affidavit in support of the order to show cause (R. 77) 
tn:ikt:s it clear that this action was brought on the basis 
of ditferent facts than those in the action in June of 1967., 
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The respondent stated "that the court June 21, 1967, adjudi-
cated plaintiff's property claims against defendant and 
allowed him credit of $45.00 therefore, but the plaintiff 
ever since said time has still willfully refused to pay 
defendant pursuant to the decree of divorce." 
Appellant concedes that if this court based it's 
decision overturning the first contempt conviction, on lack 
of jurisdiction then double jeopardy does not apply. He 
cites State v. Empey, 65 u. 609, 239 P. 25 (1925). However, 
the appellant reasons that the court could not have juris-
diction for one reason but not for another and argued that 
this court held that the trial court did have jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the personal property claims. As a result, 
the court's decision was not based on lack of jurisdiction. 
Respondent disagrees, there is no reason why the court 
could not have jurisdiction to modify a property settlement 
in a divorce decree under 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
while at the same time it's jurisdiction to find contempt 
of court is limited for failure to file an affidavit under 
78-32-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953). A reading of this 
court's decision Bott v. Bott, 20 Utah 2d, 329, 437 P.2d 
684 (1968) and Robinson v. City Court, 112 Utah 36, 185 
)')8 (1947) relied on by the court, makes it clear 
t Llie cuurt considers 78-32-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953) ' 
-11-
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a jurisdictional requirement. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD POWER TO ENJOIN APPELLANT FROM 
CONTINUING ANOTHER CIVIL ACTION NO. 178623 IN THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY AGAINST RESPONDENT. 
Appellant contends that the independent suit in questior 
Civil No. 178623, District Court, Salt Lake County, involves· 
matters not adjudicated at the hearing before the Honorable 
D. F. Wilkins in June of 1967. Appellant also contends 
that even if the property claims which are the subject of 
Civil No. 178623 were adjudicated by Judge Wilkins in 
June of 1967, res judicata must be plead in accordance 
with Rule 8(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and not by 
enjoining appellant from bringing thE: suit. 
Respondent respectfully submits that it is within 
the power of the district court to enjoin a party from 
bringing a suit based on the same factual issues which 
have or could have been litigated in a previous suit. 
~night v. Flat Top Mining Co., supra.; National Finance Co. 
~f Provo v. Daley, supra. The basis for such a power is 
WelJ. stated in Favorite v. Minneapolis Street Railway 
~mµa.!:X,, 91 N.W. 2d 459 (S. Ct., Minn., 1958) at Po 463: 
"Repeated litigation of a right which has been 
adjudicated with finality is without any legi-
1im'1tr> purpose and constitutes a vexatious and 
"PPres.sive harrassment of a litigant in contra-
vPntion of his right to a speedy and efficient 
-12--• 
administration of justice. If successive suits 
could be brought to litigate the same questions 
between the same parties or their privies as 
often as either should choose, remedial justice 
would soon become a mere mockery." 
Rule 8(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is no bar to 
the issuing of an injunction in this case. This Rule 
controls the point in the proceedings at which an affirmative 
defense must be brought up, it has nothing to do with enjoini 
the action completely. 
Respondent further submits that the district court had 
adequate evidence on which to base a finding that the propert 
I 
claims in Civil No. 178623 were adjudicated or could have 
been adjudicated before Judge Wilkins in June of 1967. 
Appellant cannot contend that he did have an adequate chance 
to present evidence to Judge Jeppson that the property 
claims in Civil No. 178623 were not the same as those 
before Judge Wilkins in June, 1967. The appellant was 
ordered to show cause why the injunction should not issue, 
in the order dated April 12, 1968 (R. 76), and respondent 
stated in her supporting affidavit (R. 77) that the appellant 
has "contemptuously filed a suit in Third District Court 
against defendant claiming damages of $2000.00 for said 
Property already adjudicated." Yet, it must be noted that 
°'!'r'"-'11ant did not even bring the file for Civil No. 178623 
1
'
1hfrh could have easily settled the whole matter. The 
-13-• 
appellant's attorney admitted that the property which was 
the subject of Civil No. 178623 had been taken before June 
of 1967. 
"THE COURT: Prior to that date--were they taken 
prior to the date of the hearing? 
MR. COTRO-MANES: Yes, not brought out, so no res 
adjudicata on those goods." (R. 109, 110) 
It was upon the appellant to bring out evidence if 
any there was justifying why the claim was not made before 
Judge Wilkins. If there was not justification for failure 
to make the claim, appellant will now be barred from bringing 
the claim up. Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., supra; 
National ~inance Company of Provo v. Daley, supra. From 
this it is clear that there was sufficient basis for a 
finding that the property claims were or could have been 
adjudicated before Judge Wilkins in June 1967. 
POINT V 
IT WAS WITHIN THE COURT'S POWER TO INCREASE THE 
SENTENCE TO FIFTEEN DAYS IN JAIL. 
Appellant contends that the court cannot increase 
Punishment at a second trial where the first conviction 
\ 
has been reversed on appeal. Appellant reasons that such 
,n i n1 rease in punishment would have a chilling effect on 
if'r
1'°' l lrl_n t..' s assertion of his constitutional right to an 
"PPea} • He cites United States v. Jackson, u.s. 20 L.ed. 
-14-.. 
2d 138, 88 s.ct. ~- (1968) for the general rule that a 
court should not penalize those who exercise their con-
stitutional rights. 
Respondent agrees that the court cannot penalize 
those who exercise their constitutional rights. However, 
there is no reason to think the court has violated this 
rule in the present case. The contempt in this case was 
a continuing contempt and the court very well could have 
determined that a greater jail term had become necessary 
in order to force appellant to obey the orders of the 
court. The court very well could have determined that 
other factors were much more important than the slight 
chilling effect involved in this caseu There is no 
evidence that it was the court's purpose to penalize 
appellant for exercising his right of appeal. See 
Rice v. Simpson, (USDC Ala., 9-26-67), 2 Criminal Law 
Reporter. 2068; State v. Jacques, (N.J. Sup. Ct., 10-7-68) 
4 Criminal Law Reporter 2075; cf Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 u.s. 319 (1937). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court 
L the trial court properly held appellant in contempt 
('LJlL and sentenced him to 15 days in the county jail 
-15-
for failure to obey the divorce decree. It is also res-
pectfully submitted that the trial court properly enjoined 
appellant from continuing a suit involving facts that had 
already been decided in the present case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ronald N. Boyce 
Salt Lake County Bar 
Legal Services, Inc. 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
